

~~SECRET~~

25X1

85 6720753 SSD

PAGE 001  
TOR: 140701Z MAR 85

NC 6720753

OO RUEAIIA  
 DE RUEHC #7414/01 0730642  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 140636Z MAR 85  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9122  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9769  
 RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3887  
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9739  
 RUEKJCS/ JCS WASHDC//JSOA PRIORITY 6056  
 RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY  
 RUEOFAA/COMUSOC FT BRAGG NC PRIORITY  
 RUEDFAB/JSOC WO WASHDC PRIORITY  
 BT  
 S E C R E T STATE 077414

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PARM, US, UR, UK  
 SUBJECT: BRITISH PAPER ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND  
 - NUCLEAR TESTING

1. (SENTIRE TEXT) WE ARE TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE TEXT OF A BRITISH PAPER ON NUCLEAR TESTING OPTIONS FOR THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE UNDER COVER OF A LETTER TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF COVER LETTER.

AT SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LUNCH ON 21 FEBRUARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE UNDERTOOK THAT WE WOULD GIVE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES COPIES OF A NEW UK PAPER ON NUCLEAR TESTING OPTIONS APPROVED BY BRITISH MINISTERS, THE ADOPTION OF WHICH COULD, IN THE UK VIEW, STRENGTHEN OUR COMMON POSITION AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE.

I NOW ENCLOSE A COPY OF THE PAPER IN QUESTION. IT ARGUES THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS A VALUABLE INSTRUMENT IN THE BATTLE TO CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THOSE WHO DO NOT ALREADY HAVE THEM; AND THAT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WILL BE IMPORTANT, AND THE UK PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECHNICAL COOPERATION

FUND AN IMPORTANT POTENTIAL WEAPON IN THE WESTERN ARMOURY AT THE CONFERENCE. IT POINTS OUT THAT THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS HARD FOR PROGRESS UNDER ARTICLE VI (THE COMMITMENT TO PURSUE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT); AND THAT, WHILE WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT, THE MAJORITY WILL ARGUE THAT THERE IS AN

25X1

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

85 6720753

SSO

PAGE 002

NC 6720753

TOR: 140701Z MAR 85

-----

INHERENT LINK BETWEEN ARTICLE VI AND PROGRESS TOWARDS A TEST BAN. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PAPER SUGGESTS NOT ONLY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT TEST SITES WILL BE IMPORTANT, BUT ALSO THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A THREE-PART PACKAGE - SET OUT IN PARA 8 OF THE PAPER WHICH WOULD, IN THE UK VIEW, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE THE US/UK POSITION AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHILE AVOIDING DAMAGE TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SAY THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING A CONSIDERED US RESPONSE, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE THE END OF THIS MONTH, GIVEN THE APPROACH OF NEXT MONTH'S THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING. D.H.A. HANNAY, MINISTER. END COVERING LETTER.

3. BEGIN BRIEF. NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TESTING.  
 - 1. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) VALUABLE INSTRUMENT TO CONTAIN SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE THEM ALREADY; ESPECIALLY IN MIDDLE EAST. ALSO PROVIDES MECHANISM FOR CONTINUING NUCLEAR TRADE ON SOUND BASIS. REVIEW CONFERENCE OF TREATY IN SEPTEMBER IMPORTANT MILESTONE FOR WESTERN NON-PROLIFERATION AIMS.

2. WESTERN STRATEGY, TO ENSURE TREATY SURVIVES REVIEW CONFERENCE INTACT AND IN GOOD HEALTH, ALREADY UNDER DISCUSSION BY ALLIES. UK TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FUND PROPOSAL IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN STRATEGY.

- 3. INEVITABLY FOCUS BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AT REVIEW CONFERENCE ON ARTICLE VI (COMMITMENT TO PURSUE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT). DO NOT ACCEPT MAJORITY VIEW THAT INHERENT LINK BETWEEN ARTICLE VI IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRESS TOWARDS TEST BAN. BUT RECOGNISE STRENGTH OF OTHERS' FEELINGS.

- 4. IN ADDITION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL FOR OBSERVER EXCHANGES, SUGGEST PACKAGE OF THREE ELEMENTS (DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF ATTACHED PAPER). IT IS DESIGNED TO AVOID DAMAGE TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS WHILE IMPROVING US/UK POSITION AT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THEREAFTER, WHETHER OR NOT RUSSIANS ACCEPT IT. END BRIEF

4. BEGIN PAPER - NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TESTING.  
 - 1. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY COUNTRY. AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID ON 8 JANUARY AFTER THE UNITED STATES/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS: "IF YOU HAVE THE ASPIRATION OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SUBJECT OF NON-PROLIFERATION HAS GOT TO BE RIGHT UP ON THE FRONT-BURNER".

WESTERN NON-PROLIFERATION AIMS

- 2. THE PRIME AIM FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES IS TO FRUSTRATE ANY ATTEMPTS BY NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PARTIES (EG LIBYA, IRAN, IRAQ) OR BY NON-PARTIES TO

EXDIS

ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE ALSO SEEK TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY BETWEEN NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS, TO PERMIT NUCLEAR TRADE TO CONTINUE. THE NPT, WITH OVER 120 PARTIES, IS A MAJOR BARRIER TO THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT MAKES A KEY CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. IT BANS THE ACQUISITION OR MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NONNUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (NNWS); AND PROVIDES FOR VERIFICATION BY PROVIDING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH NNWS ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR NUCLEAR

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

85 6720753

SSD

PAGE 003

NC 6720753

TOR: 140701Z MAR 85

FACILITIES.

3. IT IS DESIRABLE THAT THE THIRD NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN SEPTEMBER SHOULD REAFFIRM THE SUPPORT OF ALL PARTIES FOR THE TREATY. ITS OUTCOME COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT UPON THE TREATY'S FUTURE; SOME PARTIES ARE ALREADY EXPRESSING DOUBT ABOUT ITS LONG-TERM PROSPECTS AND THE PARTIES WILL HAVE TO DECIDE IN 1995 WHETHER OR NOT TO EXTEND IT. CRITICISM MAY BE EXPECTED AT THIS YEAR'S REVIEW, AS IN 1980, OF THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE NWS TO HONOUR THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI, WHICH REQUIRES THE PARTIES TO PURSUE IN GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. A NEGATIVE OUTCOME FROM THE DEBATE OVER ARTICLE VI COULD LEAD COUNTRIES TO QUESTION THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY. A WESTERN STRATEGY TO PREVENT THIS IS THEREFORE UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE ALLIES; IT COULD INCORPORATE CONTINUED COLLABORATION WHERE POSSIBLE WITH THE RUSSIANS, WHO SHARE WITH US COMPARABLE OBJECTIVES FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS STRATEGY COULD BE THE UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSAL FOR A TECHNICAL COOPERATION FUND TO BENEFIT NPT PARTIES FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THIS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE ABOUT ARTICLE IV (PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY).

## NUCLEAR TESTING CONSTRAINTS

- 4. ONE ELEMENT OF THE DEBATE ON ARTICLE VI AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WILL BE THE INEVITABLE FOCUS BY NNWS ON CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HELP TO DEFLECT ATTACKS. BUT IT IS PREDICTABLE THAT MANY PARTIES WILL PRESS FOR PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF TESTING CONSTRAINTS.

- 5. A TEST BAN IS THE ONLY SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT MEASURE MENTIONED IN THE NPT; THE PREAMBLE RECALLS THE DETERMINATION EXPRESSED IN THE 1963 PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY BY THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATION ON SUCH A BAN. MANY NNWS INTERPRET THIS AS BEING PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN THE ARTICLE VI CONTEXT, AND SEE A BAN AS A KEY STEP TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. MANY ALSO ALLEGE THAT THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF A TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS WILL BE THE TOUCHSTONE OF NWS COMMITMENT TO THE NPT. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DO NOT ACCEPT EITHER VIEW.

- 6. NON-ALIGNED PARTIES, WHO MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THAT PROBLEMS IN VERIFYING A TOTAL BAN HAVE BEEN LARGELY RESOLVED, CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS HARD AT THE REVIEW CONGERENCE FOR NEW NWS COMMITMENTS TO RESUME TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THREATEN DAMAGE TO THE NPT IF THESE ARE NOT FORTHCOMING. OUR TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION, SUMMARISED IN UNITED KINGDOM WORKING PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1983, REMAIN SOLID. OUR OPPONENTS REFUSE TO ADDRESS THESE IN SUBSTANCE, ARGUING THAT THE OBJECTIONS ARE MARGINAL. THEY REMAIN APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT TEST BAN IS BOTH DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE. SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE ALSO ATTRACTED TO THIS VIEW.

7. TO COUNTER SUCH ARGUMENTS, THE UNITED STATES HAVE PLACED INCREASING EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO SEE ANY BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING IN ITS PROPER SECURITY CONTEXT; TO SET IT IN ITS CORRECT PLACE IN THE SEQUENCE OF OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES; AND TO ENSURE THAT, AS WITH ALL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, BASIC WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS ARE NOT PUT AT RISK. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ALSO MADE AN IMPORTANT

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

85 6720753 SSO

PAGE 004  
TOR: 140701Z MAR 85

NC 6720753

-----

PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED STATES/SOVIET EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS  
AT TEST SITES TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT SO FAR  
RESPONDED.

- 8. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE MERIT  
IN CONSIDERING A PACKAGE OF MINOR NUCLEAR  
TESTING MEASURES, WHICH BY INDICATING A DEGREE OF  
FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART COULD HELP OUR POSITION. IT IS,  
HOWEVER, IMPORTANT THAT SUCH A PACKAGE SHOULD NOT IMPEDE  
OUR RESPECTIVE TESTING PROGRAMMES OR DAMAGE WESTERN

EXDIS

SECURITY. SUCH A PACKAGE, WHICH WE BELIEVE MEETS THESE  
CRITERIA, COULD COMPRISE

- I. A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION  
OVER DATA CALIBRATION ON UNDERGROUND TEST SITES,  
- BUILDING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL;
- II. THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN  
TREATY AND 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  
- WHOSE PROVISIONS THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO  
OBSERVE DESPITE NON-RATIFICATION UNTIL NOW. IN THE  
LIGHT OF PREVIOUS UNITED STATES/SOVIET POSITIONS, THIS  
- WOULD HAVE TO BE INTEGRALLY LINKED TO A FIRM POLITICAL  
- AGREEMENT THAT;
- III. NEW NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY INITIATED  
WITH TWO OBJECTIVES -
  - A. THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING A SOMEWHAT LOWER  
- THRESHOLD (BUT NO LOWER THAN WOULD BE TOLERABLE IN THE  
- LIGHT OF CONTINUED UNITED STATES, AND UNITED KINGDOM,  
- TESTING REQUIREMENTS) AND
  - B. THE SIMULTANEOUS IMPROVEMENT OF CURRENT VERIFI-  
- CATION PROVISIONS, TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE  
- BOTH WITH THE EARLIER TREATIES AND WITH ANY NEW AGREE-  
- MENTS.
- 9. WE CONSIDER THAT SUCH A PACKAGE -
  - A. WOULD NOT AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY ADVERSELY;
  - B. WOULD HELP FOSTER THE CONTINUED HEALTH OF THE NPT;
  - C. COULD REPRESENT A USEFUL EXTENSION OF CONSTRAINTS  
- ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES, AND
  - D. COULD CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE OUR KNOW-  
- LEDGE AND VERIFICATION OF THEIR TESTING PROGRAMME.

THE RUSSIANS MIGHT JIB AT SOME ELEMENTS OF THIS PACKAGE,  
IN WHICH CASE THE WESTERN POSITION WOULD NOT THEN

SUFFER. EQUALLY, GIVEN THE APPARENT IMPORTANCE THEY  
ATTACH TO MAINTAINING THE NPT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO  
MAKE THE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS WHICH UNTIL NOW THEY  
DENIED THE UNITED STATES. END PAPER. DAM

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

**SECRET**